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Abstract
This paper studies the capacity of single-source single-sink noiseless networks under adversarial or arbitrary
errors on no more than z edges. Unlike prior papers, which assume equal capacities on all links, arbitrary link
capacities are considered. Results include new upper bounds, network error correction coding strategies, and examples
of network families where our bounds are tight. An example is provided of a network where the capacity is 50%
greater than the best rate that can be achieved with linear coding. While coding at the source and sink suffices in
networks with equal link capacities, in networks with unequal link capacities, it is shown that intermediate nodes
may have to do coding, nonlinear error detection, or error correction in order to achieve the network error correction
capacity.
Index Terms
Adversarial errors, Byzantine adversary, network coding, network error correction, nonlinear coding
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding allows intermediate nodes in a network to mix the information content from different packets.
This mixing can increase throughput and reliability in networks of error-free or stochastically failing channels [1],
[2]. Unfortunately, it can also potentially increase the impact of malicious links or nodes that wish to corrupt
data transmissions. A single corrupted packet, mixed with other packets in the network, can potentially corrupt
all of the information reaching a particular destination. To combat this problem, network error correction was first
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studied by Yeung and Cai [3], [4] who investigated correction of errors in multicast network coding [1], [2], [5]
on networks with unit-capacity links. In that work, the authors showed that for any network of unit-capacity links,
the Singleton bound is tight and linear network error-correcting codes suffice to achieve the capacity, which equals
C − 2z where C is the min-cut of the network and z is a bound on the number of corrupted links [4, Theorem
4]. The problem of network coding under Byzantine attack was also investigated in [6], which gave an approach
for detecting adversarial errors under random network coding. Construction of codes that can correct errors up to
the full error-correction capability specified by the Singleton bound was presented in [7]. A variety of alternative
models of adversarial attack and strategies for detecting and correcting such errors appear in the literature. Examples
include [8]–[15].
Specifically, the network error correction problem concerns reliable information transmission in a network with
an adversary who arbitrarily corrupts the packets sent on some set of z links. The location of the adversarial links
is fixed for all time but unknown to the network user. We define a z-error correcting code for a single-source
and single-sink network to be a code that can recover the source message at the sink node if there are at most z
adversarial links in the network. The z-error correcting network capacity, henceforth simply called the capacity, is
the supremum over all rates achievable by z-error correcting codes.
In this work, we consider network error correction when links in the network may have unequal link capacities.
(A related model, where adversaries control a fixed number of nodes rather than a fixed number of edges was
studied in [16], independently and concurrently with our initial conference paper [17].) The unequal link capacity
problem is substantially different from the equal link capacity problem studied by Yeung and Cai in [3], [4] since
the rate controlled by the adversary varies with his edge choice. In the error-free case, any link l in the network
with capacity r can be represented by r edges of capacity one without loss of generality. However, in the case with
errors there is a loss of generality in using a similar representation and assuming that errors have uniform rate,
since this does not capture potential trade-offs that the adversary faces in choosing whether to attack strategically
positioned or larger capacity links. The error-correction capacity in the equal link capacity case has a simple cut-set
characterization since the adversary always finds it optimal to attack links on a minimum cut; as a result, coding
only at the source and forwarding at intermediate nodes suffices to achieve the capacity for any single-source and
single-sink network. In contrast, for networks with unequal link capacities, we show that network error correction
coding operations at intermediate nodes are needed even in the single-source single-sink case.
The cut-set approach is a simple yet powerful tool for bounding the capacity of a large network. This approach
partitions the nodes into two subsets, say S and Sc, and then bounds the rate that can be transmitted from nodes
in S to nodes in Sc. (See, for example, [18, Section 15.10].) The maximum information transmission across the
“cut” occurs when the nodes within S can collaborate perfectly among themselves and the nodes within Sc can
collaborate perfectly among themselves. In this case, S and Sc each act as “super-nodes” in a simple point-to-point
network. All that is needed for collaboration is sufficient information exchange among the nodes on each side of
the cut. Thus, the “cut-set bound” equals that rate that would be achieved in transmitting information from S to
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Fig. 1. The traditional cut set bound for a cut S between source s and sink t in the network shown in (a) equals the maximal rate
that can be transmitted from S to Sc when the nodes within S are allowed unlimited information exchange and the nodes within Sc are
allowed unlimited information exchange, as indicated by the thick bidirectional lines in (b). In the cut-set bounds employed here, we create
infinite capacity connections only from each node to nodes of higher topological order on the same side of the cut, as shown by the thick
unidirectional lines in (c). Restricting attention to nodes with input or output edges that cross the cut, gives a “zig-zag” network, as shown
in (d).
Sc if we added reliable, infinite-capacity links between each pair of nodes in S and reliable, infinite-capacity links
between each pair of nodes in Sc, as shown in Figure 1. Given a network of capacitated error-free links with a
source node s and a sink node t, minimizing over all choices of S that contain s but exclude t gives a tight bound
on the unicast capacity from s to t [19].
In contrast, this traditional cut-set bounding approach is not tight in general when it comes to the error-correction
capacity of networks with unequal link capacities, even in the case of unicast demands. In this case, two new issues
arise. We next describe each of these issues in turn.
The first issue concerns the role of feedback across S – i.e. links from Sc to S. While feedback never increases
the capacity across a cut in a network of reliable links, it can increase the error-correction capacity. Intuitively,
this is because feedback allows us to inform nodes in S about what was received by nodes in Sc, thereby aiding
in the discovery of adversarial links.1 Treating all nodes in S as one super-node and all nodes in Sc as another
super-node, as in the traditional cut-set bounding approach, makes all feedback information available to all nodes
in S and all feedforward information available to all nodes in Sc. This may give them considerably more insight
into the adversary’s location than is available to them in the original network.
We can obtain tighter bounds by taking into account limitations on which nodes in Sc can influence the values
on each feedback edge and which nodes in S have access to the feedback information. This is important in the
unequal link capacity case, because it captures trade-offs faced by the adversary in choosing whether to attack links
based on their capacity or whether they are upstream of feedback links that may give clues about the adversary’s
actions. Specifically, given an acyclic network G, we construct an acyclic network G′ by adding a reliable infinite
capacity connection from a node v ∈ S to a node w ∈ S only if G contains a directed path from node v to node
w via nodes in S, and adding a reliable infinite capacity connection from a node v ∈ Sc to a node w ∈ Sc only
1This process of discovery is complicated by the fact that the feedback links themselves may be corrupted, but feedback is, nonetheless,
clearly useful.
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if G contains a directed path from node v to node w via nodes in Sc. Figure 1(c) shows an example. Limiting
the added connections in this way creates what we call a “zig-zag” network, as shown in Figure 1. We draw only
those nodes in S and Sc with incoming or outgoing edges that cross between S and Sc, and draw the nodes on
each side of the cut in topologically increasing order. The “forward” edges across the cut point downwards in the
diagram, while “feedback” edges point upwards. By studying the capacity of these zig-zag networks, we develop
upper bounds on error-correction capacity that apply to general acyclic networks. We also illustrate the usefulness
of these bounds by giving examples where they improve upon previously known bounds and showing that they are
tight for families of networks that are special cases of zig-zag networks.
However, the second issue with the cut-set approach to bounding network capacities is the notion of a cut
itself. Reference [20] shows, for the more general case where only a subset of links are potentially adversarial, the
existence of networks for which no partition (S, Sc) yields a tight bound on the error-correction capacity. This is
proven by example using a network whose minimal cut (which has no feedback links) yields a capacity bound that
is proven to be unachievable. As a result, knowledge of the the capacity of the network’s minimal cut is insufficient
to determine the capacity of all possible networks, and we cannot hope to derive cut-set bounds that are tight in
general. Nonetheless, given the complexity of taking into account the full network topology, we proceed to study
the cut-set approach, deriving general bounds and demonstrating that those bounds are tight in some cases.
Specifically, in Section III we begin with the cut-set upper bound given by the capacity of the two-node network
shown in Fig. 2, which is the only cyclic network we consider in this paper. In this network, the source node can
transmit packets to the sink node along the forward links and the sink node can send information back to the source
node along the feedback links. As mentioned above, this cut-set bound can be quite loose since it assumes that all
feedback is available to the source node and all information crossing the cut in the forward direction is available
to the sink. We therefore develop a new cut-set upper bound for general acyclic networks by taking into account
more details of the topological relationships among links on the cut, as in the zig-zag network construction shown
in Figure 1.
In Section IV, we consider a variety of linear and nonlinear coding strategies useful for achieving the capacity
of various example networks. We prove the insufficiency of linear network codes to achieve the capacity by
providing an example of a network where the capacity is 50% greater than the linear coding capacity and is
achieved using a nonlinear error detection strategy. A similar example for the problem with Byzantine attack on
nodes rather than edges appears in [16]. We also give examples of single-source and single-sink networks for
which intermediate nodes must perform coding, nonlinear error detection or error correction in order to achieve
the network capacity. We describe a simple greedy algorithm for error correction at intermediate nodes. We then
introduce a new coding strategy called “guess-and-forward.” In this strategy, an intermediate node which receives
some redundant information from multiple paths guesses which of its upstream links controlled by the adversary.
The intermediate node forwards its guess to the sink which tests the hypothesis of the guessing node. In Section V,
we show that guess-and-forward achieves network capacity on the two-node network with feedback links of Fig. 2,
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Fig. 2. Two-node network composed of n forward links and m feedback links.
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Fig. 3. Four node acyclic networks: Given the cut Q = cut({s, B}, {A, t}), unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source s
to its neighbor B on one side of the cut and from node A to sink t on the other side of the cut, respectively. There are feedback links from
A to B.
as well as the family of four-node acyclic networks in Fig. 3 when the capacity of each feedback link is not too
small (i.e. above a value given by a linear optimization).2 Finally, we apply guess-and-forward strategy to zig-zag
networks, deriving achievable rates and presenting conditions under which our upper bound is tight. We conclude
in Section VI with a discussion of future work.
Portions of this work have appeared in our earlier work [17], [21], which introduced the network error correction
problem with unequal link capacities and presented a subset of the results.
2After the submission of this paper, we obtained a new result that improves upon the bound in Section III for the special case of
small-capacity feedback links. We mention the idea briefly as a footnote in Section III and will present it formally in an upcoming paper.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
Consider a directed acyclic communication network G = (V, E) with unequal link capacities. Let r(l) denote
the capacity of edge l ∈ E . A source node s ∈ V transmits information to a sink node t ∈ V over the network G.
Transmissions occur on the links according to their topological order, i.e. a link l transmits after all its incident
incoming links, and we regard a link error as being applied upon transmission. A link (or node) is said to be
upstream of another link (or node) iff there is a directed path starting from the former and ending with the latter.
A link (or node) is said to be downstream of another link (or node) iff there is a directed path starting from the
latter and ending with the former.
In this paper, we consider the problem of correcting arbitrary adversarial errors on up to z links. The location
of error links is fixed for all time but unknown to the network user.
Definition 1: A network code is z-error link-correcting if the source message can be recovered by the sink node
provided that the adversary controls at most z links. Thus a z-error link-correcting network code can correct any
τ adversarial links for τ 6 z.
Let (S, Sc) be a partition of V , and define the cut for the partition (S, Sc) by
cut(S, Sc) = {(a, b) ∈ E : a ∈ S, b ∈ Sc}.
The cut cut(S, Sc) separates nodes a and b if a ∈ S and b ∈ Sc. We use CS(a, b) to denote the set of cuts between
a and b. Given a cut Q = cut(S, Sc), we call any link in Q a forward link, and we call any link from Sc to S a
feedback link.
For the achievable strategies in Sections IV and V, we assume that coding occurs in the finite field Fq for some
prime power q. An error on any link l ∈ E is specified by a vector el containing r(l) symbols in Fq. The output
yl of link l equals the sum in Fq of the input xl to link l and the error el applied to link l, i.e., yl = xl + el. We
say that an error occurs on the link l if el 6= 0.
As in [3], [4], we can consider a linear network code V that assigns a set of r(l) vectors {vF(l)1, vF(l)2, .., vF(l)r(l)},
called global coding vectors, to each link l ∈ E in the network. Let
φ˜l(w) = {〈w, vF(l)i〉 : 1 6 i 6 r(l)}
denote the error-free output of link l when the network input is w where 〈a, b〉 denotes the inner product of row
vectors a and b. We use e = (el : l ∈ E) to denote the vector of errors on the entire network. The output of a link
l is a function of both the network input w and the error vector e, which we denote by ψl(w, e). For each node
v ∈ V , we use Γ+(v) = {(c, v) : (c, v) ∈ E} and Γ−(v) = {(v, c) : (v, c) ∈ E} to denote the sets of incoming
and outgoing edges respectively for node v. With this notation, a sink node t cannot distinguish between the case
where w is the network input and error e occurs and the case where w′ is the network input and error e′ occurs if
and only if
(ψl(w, e) : l ∈ Γ+(t)) = (ψl(w
′, e′) : l ∈ Γ+(t)). (1)
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Let N(e) = |{l ∈ E : el 6= 0}| denote the number of links in which an error occurs. We say that any pair of input
vectors w and w′ are z-links separable at sink node t if (1) does not hold for any pair of error vectors e and e′
such that N(e) 6 z and N(e′) 6 z. Lemma 1 of [4] establishes the linear properties of ψl(w, e) for networks with
unit link capacities. This result extends directly to networks with arbitrary link capacities.
Lemma 1: For all l ∈ E , all network inputs w and w′, error vectors e and e′, and µ ∈ Fq,
ψl(w + w
′, e+ e′) = ψl(w, e) + ψl(w
′, e′)
and
ψl(µw) = µψl(w).
From Lemma 1,
ψl(w, e) = ψl(w, 0) + ψl(0, e) = φ˜l(w) + θl(e),
where θl(e) = ψl(0, e) for any link l. Thus ψl(w, e) can be written as the sum of a linear function of w and a
linear function of e.
III. UPPER BOUNDS
In this section, we consider upper bounds on network error correction capacity. Let X denote the source alphabet
and q the size of the (arbitrary) link alphabet. The corresponding network transmission rate is given by log |X|log q .
We first derive the cut-set upper bound obtained from coalescing all nodes on each side of the cut into a
super-node, resulting in a two-node network as shown in Fig. 2.
Lemma 2: Consider the two-node network shown in Fig. 2 with arbitrary link capacities. Let Dp denote the sum
of the p smallest forward link capacities. The network error correction capacity of this network is upper bounded
by 

0 if n 6 2z
min{Dn−z ,Dn−2(z−m)+} if n > 2z
Proof: Case 1) n 6 2z.
Suppose that C > 0 and we show a contradiction. Since C > 0, there are two codewords x and y in X that can be
sent reliably. When x is sent along the forward links and the leftmost z links are adversarial, the adversary changes
x to x′ so that the outputs of the ⌊n/2⌋ leftmost links of x′ are the same as that of y. Similarly, when y is sent
along the forward links and the rightmost z links are adversarial, the adversary changes y to y′ so that the outputs
of the rightmost ⌈n/2⌉ links of y′ are the same as that of x. Then the two codewords cannot be distinguished and
this contradicts C > 0.
Case 2) n > 2z.
When the sink knows z adversarial links are the z largest capacities forward links, the maximum achievable
capacity is Dn−z. When m 6 z and all m feedback links are adversarial, there are z−m adversarial forward links
whose locations are unknown. In this scenario, we show that the best achievable rate is Dn−2(z−m), which is the
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sum of n−2(z−m) smallest forward link capacities. We assume that |X| > qDn−2(z−m) , and show that this leads to
a contradiction. F = {l1, .., ln} denotes the set of forward links such that the links indexed in increasing capacity
order, i.e., r(l1) 6 . . . 6 r(ln). Since |X| > qDn−2(z−m) and Dn−2(z−m) is sum of the n − 2(z − m) smallest
forward link capacities, there exist two distinct codewords x, x′ ∈ X such that φ˜li(x) = φ˜li(x′) ∀i = 1, .., n − 2z.
So we can write
O(x) = {y1, .., yn−2z , p1, .., pz , w1, .., wz},
O(x′) = {y1, .., yn−2z, p
′
1, .., p
′
z , w
′
1, .., w
′
z},
where O(x) denotes the error-free vector of symbols on Q when codeword x is transmitted.
We can construct z-error links that changes O(x) to the value {y1, .., yn−2z , p′1, .., p′z , w1, .., wz} as follows. We
apply an error of value (p′i − pi) mod q on links ln−2z+i for 1 6 i 6 z. Since this does not change the output
value of other n− z links, we obtain {y1, .., yn−2z, p′1, .., p′z , w1, .., wz}. For x′, we can follow a similar procedure
to construct z error links that change the value of O(x′) to {y1, .., yn−2z , p′1, .., p′z , w1, .., wz}. Thus, sink node u
cannot reliably distinguish between the source symbol x and x′, which gives a contradiction.
Therefore, the upper bound on achievable capacity is min{Dn−z,Dn−2(z−m)+}.
In Section V we show that this bound is the actual capacity of the two-node network. Thus, the super-node
construction gives the following cut-set upper bound for general acyclic networks.
Lemma 3: Given any cut Q ∈ CS(s, t) with k forward links and r feedback links, let Dp denote the sum of the
k smallest forward link capacities. The network error correction capacity is upper bounded by

0 if k 6 2z
min{Dk−z,Dk−2(z−r)+} if k > 2z
However, we can show that the above upper bound is not tight using the following generalized Singleton bound,
which was presented in our conference paper [17]. A similar upper bound for the problem of adversarial attack on
nodes rather than edges was given in independent work [16].
Definition 2: Any set of links S on a cut Q ∈ CS(s, t) is said to satisfy the downstream condition on Q if none
of the links in Q\S are downstream of any link in S.
Lemma 4: (A generalized Singleton bound) Consider any z-error correcting network code with source alphabet
X in an acyclic network G. Consider any set S consisting of 2z links on a source-sink cut Q ∈ CS(s, t) that
satisfies the downstream condition on Q. Let M =
∑
(a,b)∈Q\S r(a, b) be the total capacity of the links in Q\S.
Then
log |X| 6M · log q.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of the network Singleton bound for the equal link capacity case in [3]. We
assume that |X| > qM , and show that this leads to a contradiction.
Given a cut Q, K(Q) denotes the number of links in Q. For brevity, let Q = {l1, .., lK(Q)} where S =
{lK(Q)−2z+1, ...lK(Q)} and links in S are ordered topologically, i.e., lK(Q)−2z+i is not downstream of lK(Q)−2z+j
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Fig. 4. Four-node acyclic network: unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source s to its neighbor B on one side of the cut
and from node A to sink t on the other side of the cut, respectively. There are 2 forward links of capacity 1 from s to A, 4 forward links
of capacity 10 from B to t, and 3 feedback links from A to B.
for any i < j. Since |X| > qM and M is the capacity of Q\S, there exist two distinct codewords x, x′ ∈ X such
that φ˜li(x) = φ˜li(x′) ∀i = 1, ..,K(Q) − 2z. So we can write
O(x) = {y1, .., yK(Q)−2z , p1, .., pz , w1, .., wz},
O(x′) = {y1, .., yK(Q)−2z, p
′
1, .., p
′
z , w
′
1, .., w
′
z},
where O(x) denotes the error-free vector of symbols on Q when codeword x is transmitted.
We will show that it is possible for the adversary to produce exactly the same outputs on all the channels in Q
when errors occur on at most z links in Q.
Assume that the true network input is x. The adversary will inject errors on z links lK(Q)−2z+1, .., lK(Q)−z
in this order as follows. First the adversary applies an error on link lK(Q)−2z+1 to change the output from
p1 to p′1. The output of links (lK(Q)−2z+2, .., lK(Q)) may be affected by this change, but the outputs of links
(l1, .., lK(Q)−2z) will not. Let p′i(j) and w′i(j) denote the outputs of links lK(Q)−2z+i and lK(Q)−z+i, respectively
after the adversary has injected errors on link lK(Q)−2z+j , where j = 1, 2, .., z with p′1(1) = p′1. Then the adversary
injects errors on link lK(Q)−2z+2 to change its output from p′2(1) to p′2. This process continues until the adversary
finishes injecting errors on z links lK(Q)−2z+1, .., lK(Q)−z and the output of this channel changes from O(x) to
{y1, .., yK(Q)−2z , p
′
1, .., p
′
z , w
′
1(z), .., w
′
z(z)}. Now suppose the input is x′. We can follow a similar procedure by
injecting errors on z links lK(Q)−z+1, .., lK(Q). Then the adversary can produce the outputs
{y1, .., yK(Q)−2z , p
′
1, .., p
′
z , w
′
1(z), .., w
′
z(z)}.
Thus, sink node t cannot reliably distinguish between the source symbol x and x′, which gives a contradiction.
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Consider the example four-node network shown in Fig. 4. When z = 2, the two-node bound lemma 3 gives the
upper bound 22. The generalized Singleton bound gives upper bound 2.
However, the generalized Singleton bound is also not tight. Building on ideas from the above bounds, we proceed
to derive tighter bounds.
Let QR denote the set of feedback links across cut Q. Given a set of m 6 z feedback links W ⊂ QR and a
set of k 6 z −m forward links F ⊂ Q, we use NF,Wz,m,k(Q) to denote the upper bound obtained from lemma 4
(generalized Singleton bound) when evaluated for z −m− k adversarial links on the cut Q after erasing W and
F from the graph G. Let
Nz,k,m(Q) = min
{F⊂Q,|F |=k6z−m}
min
{W⊂QR,|W |=m6z}
NF,Wz,k,m(Q).
Then we define Nz(Q) as follows.
Nz(Q) = min
06m6z
min
06k6z−m
Nz,k,m(Q).
For instance, consider the 2-layer zig-zag network in Fig. 6. If z = 4, k = 1 and m = 1, Nz,k,m(Q) = 19 by
choosing F = {l1}, W = {l6}, and removing {l2, l3, l4, l5} in the application of the Singleton bound after erasing
F and W . By taking the minimum over k and m, we can show that Nz(Q) = 19.
Lemma 5: (Cut-set upper bound 1) Consider any z-error correcting network code with source alphabet X in an
acyclic network.
log |X| 6 min
Q∈CS(s,t)
{Nz(Q)} · log q
Proof: For any cut Q ∈ CS(s, t), the adversary can erase a set W ⊂ QR of feedback links and a set F ⊂ Q
of forward links where |W | = m 6 z and |F | = k 6 z −m. Applying Lemma 4 on Q after erasing W and F
gives the upper bound NF,Wz,k,m(Q). By taking the minimum over all cuts Q, we obtain the above bound.
The following examples illustrate how the bound in Lemma 5 tightens the generalized Singleton bound. We first
consider a four-node acyclic network as shown in Fig. 5. In each example, unbounded reliable communication is
allowed from source s to its neighbor B on one side of the cut and from node A to sink t on the other side of the
cut. There are feedback links with arbitrary capacities from A to B.
When we compute the generalized Singleton bound, for any cut Q, we choose and erase 2z links in the cut such
that none of the remaining links in the cut are downstream of the chosen 2z links. Then we sum the remaining
link capacities and take the minimum over all cuts. Because of the downstream condition, when the link capacities
between s and A are much larger than the link capacities between B and t, the Singleton bound may not be tight.
For example, in the network in Fig. 5 (a), if z = 2, then the generalized Singleton bound gives upper bound 20.
However, when the adversary declares that he will use two forward links between s and A, we obtain the erasure
bound 4.
As another example, consider the network in Fig. 5 (b) when z = 2. Applying the generalized Singleton bound
gives upper bound 16. If the adversary erases one of the forward links between s and A and we apply the generalized
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Fig. 5. Four-node acyclic network: unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source s to its neighbor B on one side of the cut
and from node A to sink t on the other side of the cut, respectively. (a) There are 2 links of capacity 10 from s to A and 4 unit-capacity
links from B to t. (b) There are 5 links of capacity 3 from s to A. There are 2 links of capacity 2 and 3 links of capacity 1 from B to t.
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Fig. 6. 2-layer zig-zag network: unbounded reliable communication is allowed from s to B, from B to D, from A to C, and from C to t
respectively. There are sufficiently large number of feedback links from A to B. There is one feedback link from C to D.
Singleton bound on the remaining network, then our upper bound is improved to 15. The intuition behind this
example is that when the adversary erases k 6 z large capacities links which do not satisfy the downstream
condition, applying the generalized Singleton bound on remaining network with (z − k) adversarial links can give
a tighter bound.
For the 2-layer zig-zag network in Fig. 6, when z = 4, the min-cut is 37 and the generalized Singleton bound
gives upper bound 27. Suppose that the adversary declares that he will use the feedback link between C and D and
the forward link with capacity 6 between s and A. By applying the generalized Singleton bound on the remaining
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network with two adversarial links, we obtain 37-6-(3+3+3+3)=19. The intuition behind this example is that the
links between B and C and the links between D and t have the same topological order once the single feedback
link between C and D is erased. Since the generalized Singleton bound is obtained by erasing 2z links on the cut
such that none of the remaining links on the cut is downstream of any erased links, erasing the single feedback link
between C and D yields a tighter Singleton bound even with fewer adversarial links. Moreover, before applying
the Singleton bound, we first erase the link with capacity 6, which is the largest link between s and A as we did
in example in Fig. 5(b).
Next, we introduce another upper bounding approach which considers confusion between two possible sets of
z adversarial links, each containing some forward links as well as the corresponding downstream feedback links
required to prevent error propagation. Consider any cut Q = cut(P,V\P ) and sets Z1, Z2 ⊂ Q. We say that a
feedback link l ∈ QR is directly downstream of a forward link l′ ∈ Q (and that l′ is directly upstream of l) if there
is a directed path starting from l′ and ending with l that does not include other links in Q or QR. Let W1 be the
set of links in QR which are directly downstream of a link in Z1 and upstream of a link in (Q\Z1)\Z2. Let W2
be the set of links in QR which are directly downstream of a link in Z2 and upstream of a link in Q\Z2.
Lemma 6: (Cut-set upper bound 2) Let M =∑(a,b)∈(Q\Z1)\Z2 r(a, b) denote the total capacity of the remaining
links on (Q\ Z1)\Z2. If |Zi ∪Wi| 6 z for i = 1, 2, then
log |X| 6M · log q.
Proof: We assume that |X| > qM , and show that this leads to a contradiction. Let K(Q) denote the number of
links on the cut Q. Since |X| > qM , from the definition of M , there exist two distinct codewords x, x′ ∈ X such
that error-free outputs on the links in (Q\Z1)\Z2 are the same. Let c = |Z1| and d = |Z2|. Then we can write
O(x) = {y1, .., yK(Q)−c−d, u1, .., uc, w1, .., wd},
O(x′) = {y1, .., yK(Q)−c−d, u
′
1, .., u
′
c, w
′
1, .., w
′
d},
where (y1, .., yK(Q)−c−d) denotes the error-free outputs on the links in (Q\Z1)\Z2 for x and x′; (u1, .., uc) and
(u′1, .., u
′
c) denote the error-free outputs on the links in Z1 for x and x′ respectively; and (w1, .., wd) and (w′1, .., w′d)
denote the error-free outputs on the links in Z2 for x and x′ respectively. We will show that it is possible for the
adversary to produce exactly the same outputs on all the channels in Q under x and x′ when errors occur on at
most z links. When codeword x is sent, we use Bl(x) to denote the error-free symbols on feedback link l.
Assume the input of network is x. The adversary chooses feedback links set W1 and forward links set Z1 as its
z adversarial links. First the adversary applies errors on Z1 to change the output from ui to u′i for ∀1 6 i 6 c and
to cause each feedback link l ∈W1 to transmit Bl(x). Since all feedback links which are directly downstream of a
link in Z1 and upstream of a link in (Q\Z1)\Z2 transmit the error-free symbols, the outputs on links in (Q\Z1)\Z2
are not affected. The outputs on links in Z2 may be affected, and we denote their new values by {w′′1 , .., w′′d}. Thus,
the sink observes {y1, .., yK(Q)−c−d, u′1, .., u′c, w′′1 , .., w′′d}.
12
st
A B
2
2
22
l1
l2
l3l4
l5
l6
l7
l8
222111
1
✙
✙
✠☛
❥
❯
❥
❯
✲
✙
✙
✠✠✠✠
∞
∞
Fig. 7. Four node acyclic network: There are 4 links of capacity 2 from s to A. There are 3 links of capacity 2 and 1 links of capacity 4
from B to t.
When codeword x′ is transmitted, the adversary chooses feedback links set W2 and forward links set Z2 as its
z adversarial links. The adversary applies errors on them to change (w1, .., wd) to (w′′1 , .., w′′d) and to cause each
feedback link l ∈ W2 to transmit Bl(x′). Since all feedback links which are directly downstream of a link in Z2
and upstream of a link in Q\Z2 transmit the error-free symbols, the outputs on any other links are not affected.
Therefore, the output is changed from O(x′) to {y1, .., yK(Q)−c−d, u′1, .., u′c, w′′1 , .., w′′d}. Thus, the sink node t cannot
reliably distinguish between the codewords x and x′, which gives a contradiction.
Given a cut Q, we consider all possible sets (Z1, Z2) on Q satisfying the condition of Lemma 6. We choose
sets (Z∗1 , Z
∗
2 ) among them that have the maximum total link capacities and define Mz(Q) to be the sum of the
capacities of the links in (Q\Z∗1 )\Z∗2 . This gives the upper bound
log |X| 6 min
Q∈cut(s,t)
Mz(Q) · log q.
The following example shows that we can obtain a tighter upper bound using Lemma 6. For the example network
in Fig. 7, when z = 3, Lemma 5 gives upper bound 9. However, Lemma 6 gives a tighter upper bound 8 when
Z∗1 = {l1, l2, l5} , and Z∗2 = {l6, l7, l8}.
Now we derive a generalized cut-set upper bound that unifies Lemma 5 and Lemma 6. Given a cut Q, consider
a set F ⊂ Q of forward links and a set W ⊂ QR of feedback links such that |F |+ |W | 6 z. Let CF,Wz (Q) denote
the upper bound obtained from Lemma 6 when evaluated for z−m−k adversarial links on the cut Q after erasing
F and W from the original graph G. Then
min
{F⊂Q,W⊂QR,|F |+|W |6z}
CF,Wz (Q)
is an upper bound on the error correction capacity of G. This includes the bound Nz(Q) of Lemma 5 as a special
case, since the generalized Singleton bound is a special case of the upper bound in Lemma 6 corresponding to
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the case where Z1 ∪ Z2 is a set of 2z links satisfying the downstream condition. It is also clear that CF,Wz (Q) is
the same as the bound in Lemma 6 when F = W = ∅. Note however that any bound CF,Wz (Q) obtainable with
a nonempty set W of erased feedback links is also obtainable by including those links in the sets W1 and W2 of
Lemma 6 instead of erasing them. Thus, we define
Cz(Q) = min
{F⊂Q,|F |6z}
CF,∅z (Q)
and state our upper bound as follows.3
Theorem 1: (A generalized cut-set upper bound) Consider any z-error correcting network code with source
alphabet X in an acyclic network. Then
log |X| 6 min
Q∈CS(s,t)
Cz(Q) · log q.
IV. CODING STRATEGIES
We consider a variety of linear and nonlinear coding strategies useful for achieving the capacity of various
example networks. We show the insufficiency of linear network codes for achieving the capacity in general. We
also demonstrate examples of networks with a single source and a single sink where, unlike the equal link capacity
case, it is necessary for intermediate nodes to do coding, nonlinear error detection or error correction in order to
achieve the capacity. We then introduce a new coding strategy, guess-and-forward.
A. Error detection at intermediate nodes and insufficiency of linear codes
Here we show that there exists a network where the capacity is 50% greater than the best rate that can be
achieved with linear coding. We consider the single source and the single sink network in Fig. 8, where source s
aims to transmit the information to a sink node t. We index the links and assume the capacities of links as shown
in Fig. 8. For a single adversarial link, our upper bound from Theorem 1 is 2.
Lemma 7: Given a network in Fig. 8, for a single adversarial link, rate 2 is asymptotically achievable with a
nonlinear error detection strategy, whereas scalar linear network coding achieves at most 4/3.
Proof: We first illustrate the nonlinear error detection strategy as follows. Source wants to transmit two packets
(P1, P2). We send them in n channel uses, but each packet has only n− 1 bits. We use one bit as a signaling bit.
We send (P1, P2) down all links in the top layer. In the middle layer, we do the following operations:
1. Send the linear combination of P1 and P2, aP1 + bP2, down link l4.
2. Send P1 down both links l5 and l6.
3 After submitting this paper, we found a way to tighten the above bound for the case of small feedback link capacity. Briefly, the key
idea is to note that instead of choosing all the links in Wi as adversarial links as in the proof of Lemma 6, another possibility is to choose
only a subset Yi ⊂ Wi as adversarial links, as long as the values on links in Wi\Yi and links in Q\Zi that are directly upstream of links
in Wi\Yi are the same under the two confusable codewords x and x′. The capacities of these links then appear as part of the upper bound;
thus, this bound is useful for cases where feedback links have small capacity. This result will be presented formally in an upcoming paper.
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Fig. 8. A single source and a single sink network : all links on the top layer have capacity 2. All links on the middle and bottom layer
have capacity 1. When z = 1, the capacity of this network is 2 while linear network codes achieve at most 4/3.
3. Send P2 down both links l7 and l8.
4. Send a different linear combination of P1 and P2, cP1 + dP2, down link l9.
At the bottom layer, we do the following operations:
1. Forward the received packet on link l10.
2. Send a 1 followed by P1 on link l11 if the two copies of P1 match, send a 0 otherwise.
3. Send a 1 followed by P2 on link l12 if the two copies of P2 match, send a 0 otherwise.
4. Forward the received packet on link l13.
We can show that above nonlinear error detection strategy allows a sink node to decode (P1, P2). Suppose that
(a, b) and (c, d) are independent. Then coding vectors on any two links on the bottom layer are independent and
they satisfy with MDS (maximum distance separable) properties. If nothing was sent down both l11 and l12, the
decoder can recover (P1, P2) from the information received on links l10 and l13. If nothing was sent down only
on l11, then the outputs of l12 and l13 should not be corrupted and the decoder can recover (P1, P2). Similarly, the
decoder can decode correctly when nothing was sent down only on l12. If all the links in the bottom layer received
symbols, there is at most one erroneous link on the bottom layer, which has MDS code. Thus we can achieve rate
2− 2
n
with this error detection strategy.
Now we show that scalar linear network code can achieve at most rate 4/3. Suppose that we want to achieve the
linear coding capacity k/n by transmitting k symbols reliably by using a scalar linear network code φ over the
finite field Fq in n rounds. To show the insufficiency of linear coding for achieving this capacity, from (1), it is
sufficient to prove that there exist pairs (w, e) and (w′, e′) for linear network code φ such that
(ψl(w, e) : l ∈ Γ+(t)) = (ψl(w
′, e′) : l ∈ Γ+(t)),
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and N(e), N(e′) 6 1. Since the above equation is equivalent to
(φ˜l(w − w
′) : l ∈ Γ+(t)) = (θl(−e+ e
′) : l ∈ Γ+(t)),
by linearity, it suffices to find a source vector x ∈ X and error vector e′′ such that N(e′′) 6 2 and
(φ˜l(x) : l ∈ Γ+(t)) = (θl(e
′′) : l ∈ Γ+(t)), (2)
where X = Fkq is the source alphabet. We will show that there exists (x, e′′) satisfying the above equation when
errors occur on the links l1 and l3 in error vector e′′.
Let Gt denote the 4n× k transfer matrix between s and t in the n rounds. Its rows are the global coding vectors
assigned on l10, l11, l12, and l13 in the n rounds. Note that to transmit k symbols reliably, Gt should have rank k.
Let M1 and M2 denote the transfer matrices between l1 and t, and between l3 and t during n rounds respec-
tively. To transmit k symbols reliably, both M1 and M2 should have rank at least k, i.e., rank(M1) > k and
rank(M2) > k. Otherwise, when the adversarial link is on the top layer, the maximum achievable rate is at most
min{rank(M1), rank(M2)} from the data processing inequality, which gives a contradiction.
Let e1 and e2 denote the errors occurring on links l1 and l3, respectively. Error e1 propagates to l10 and l11, and
error e2 propagates to l12 and l13.
From (2), we have the following set of equations
Gtx =

 M1 0
0 M2

 (e1, e2)τ =M · e′′.
Since rank(M1) > k and rank(M2) > k, rank(M) > 2k. Then A = {Gtx : x ∈ X} and B = {Me′′ : e′′ ∈
F
4n
q } are both linear subspaces of F4nq , and dim(A) = k and dim(B) > 2k.
Let {x1, .., xk} denote a basis of X. Then {Gtx1, .., Gtxk} is a basis of A. Similarly, since rank(M) > 2k,
there exist 2k vectors {y1, .., y2k} such that {My1, ..,My2k} is a subset of basis of B.
If 3k > 4n, since both A and B are linear subspaces of F4nq , there exists (a1, .., ak, b1, .., b2k) 6= (0, ..., 0) such
that
k∑
i=1
ai(Gtxi) +
2k∑
j=1
bi(Myi) = 0.
If (a1, .., ak) = (0, ..., 0) or (b1, .., b2k) = (0, ..., 0), then it contradicts the linear independence of basis. Thus,
(a1, .., ak) 6= (0, ..., 0) and (b1, .., b2k) 6= 0. Then,
k∑
i=1
ai(Gtxi) +
2k∑
j=1
bi(Myi)
=
k∑
i=1
Gt(aixi) +
2k∑
j=1
M(biyi)
=
k∑
i=1
Gt(aixi)−
2k∑
j=1
M(−biyi)
= 0.
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Fig. 9. A single source and a single sink network : The link capacity in this network is as follows: r(l1) = r(l2) = r(l3) = r(l4) =
4, r(l5) = ... = r(l10) = 2. All the links in the middle layer have capacity 1. Error correction at Y3 and Y4 is necessary for achieving the
capacity.
Therefore, we have found nonzero x =
∑k
i=1 aixi and (e1, e2)τ = −
∑2k
j=1(−bjyj) such that Gtx =Me′′.
It completes the proof.
The following corollary shows that vector linear codes4 (see e.g. [22]) also achieve at most rate 4/3.
Corollary 1: For the network in Fig. 8 with a single adversarial link, a vector linear network code can achieve
at most rate 4/3.
Proof: For a vector linear code, the outgoing edges of each node carries vectors of alphabet symbols which
are function of the vectors carried on the incoming edges to the node. We consider a vector linear code that groups
m symbols into a vector. As in lemma 7, we define the (4n)m× km transfer matrix Gt between s and t. Transfer
matrices M1 and M2 are also defined in the same way, and rank(M1) > km and rank(M2) > km. As in the
proof of lemma 7, when k > 4n3 , we can show that there exists vectors (x, e1, e2) (x 6= 0) satisfying
Gtx = (M1 · e1,M2 · e2).
B. Error correction at intermediate nodes
We next give an example in which error correction at intermediate nodes is used for achieving the capacity. The
intuition behind our approach is that error correction at intermediate nodes can reduce the error propagation to
the links in the bottom layer and MDS code assigned on the bottom layer gives the correct output. We consider a
4A vector linear code is a linear code operating over a vector of symbols.
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single source-destination network in Fig. 9. For a single adversarial link, upper bound from Theorem 1 is 8. From
Sec. IV-A, the upper bound on the linear coding capacity is
∑10
i=5 r(li)/(m+ 1) = 6.
Lemma 8: Given the network in Fig. 9, for a single adversarial link, rate 8 is achievable using error correction
at intermediate nodes.
Proof: Without loss of generality, all nodes except Y3 and Y4 forward their received information. We first
assign a (12, 8) MDS code (a, b, . . . , l) on the bottom layer links and apply a (4,2) MDS code at each decision
node, e.g., we assign (e, f, e + f, e + 2f) and (g, h, g + h, g + 2h) on incoming links to Y3 and Y4 respectively.
Then we can assign codewords on all links in the network since all nodes except Y3 and Y4 are forwarding nodes.
If the adversarial link is on the middle or bottom layer, at most two errors are propagated to the sink node and the
MDS code assigned on the bottom layer gives the correct output. If the adversarial link is on the top layer, at most
two errors are propagated to the sink node through forwarding nodes Y1, Y2, Y5, and Y6. Since at most one error
is incoming to Y3 and Y4 respectively, the (4,2) MDS code applied at each decision node gives error-free output
(e, f) and (g, h). Therefore, when the adversarial link is on the top layer, at most two errors are propagated to the
sink and the (12,8) MDS code returns the correct output.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for error correction at intermediate nodes
M ← N
CS ← ∅
G′ = G
While |M | > 1 and ∃i s.t. d(G′, i) > 0, i ∈M
M ′ =M − I(G′,M)
CS′ = CS ∪ SI(G′,M)
G′ = G′ − SI(G′,M)
M =M ′, CS = CS′.
endwhile
return CS
One possible generalization of the above intermediate node error correction is as follows. Given an acyclic
network G = (V, E), we use cG(s, i) and cG(i, t) denote the min-cut between the source s and i, and the min-
cut between i and the sink t in G, respectively. We assume that there is a fixed set of nodes N ⊂ V such that
cG(s, i) > cG(i, t) for ∀i ∈ N and error correction can be applied only at nodes in N . For instance, in Fig. 9,
N = {Y3, Y4}. Let d(G, i) = cG(s, i) − cG(i, t) denote the difference between the max-flow from s to i and the
max-flow from i to t.
The selection function I(G, N) chooses a node i ∈ N on G which maximizes d(G, i). Precisely,
I(G, N) = argmax
i∈N
{d(G, i)}.
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Fig. 10. A single source and a single sink network : all links on the top or middle layer have capacity one. All links on the bottom layer
have capacity 2. In this network, coding at intermediate nodes but not error-detection and correction is necessary for achieving the capacity.
Here is the outline of our greedy algorithm with error correction at intermediate nodes. Given an acyclic network
G and the set of error correction nodes N , we choose a node i = I(G, N) that maximizes d(G, i) on G. Since
cG(s, i) is the max-flow from s to i, we can find cG(s, i) paths so that each path carries one symbol from s to i.
Likewise, we also find cG(i, t) paths from i to t. Let SI(G,M) denote the subgraph composed of above paths. We
assign a (cG(s, i), cG(i, t)) MDS code on SI(G,M). We remove SI(G′,M) from G and add it to CS which denotes
the union of subgraphs for which codewords are already assigned. We also remove i from N . We repeat the above
procedure until N = ∅ or there is no node i ∈ N such that d(G, i) > 0. A precise description of the algorithm is
shown in algorithm 1. Since max-flow can be computed in polynomial-time, this algorithm is a polynomial-time
greedy algorithm.
C. Coding at intermediate nodes
Here we consider an example of a single-source and single-sink network, shown in Fig. 10, whose capacity is
achieved using linear coding at intermediate nodes rather than nonlinear error correction or detection. For a single
adversarial link, the upper bound obtained from Theorem 1 is 4.
Lemma 9: Given the network in Fig. 10, for a single adversarial link, coding at intermediate nodes achieves the
rate 4.
Proof: To achieve rate 4, any four links on the top layer should carry 4 independent packets. Otherwise,
when the adversarial link is on the top layer, source cannot transmit 4 packets reliably. Then the data processing
inequality gives a contradiction. Similarly, any two links on the bottom layer should carry 4 independent packets.
Since Yi is connected to at most four different nodes among (X1, ..,X6) for ∀1 6 i 6 4 and all links in the middle
layer have capacity 1, each of Y1, Y2, Y3, and Y4 receives all independent information. Thus we cannot apply
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simple error-detection or correction at Y1, Y2, Y3, and Y4. Suppose that only forwarding strategy is used on this
network. Then we show that rate 4 is not achievable. There are six symbols on the top layer. Since we use only
forwarding, these are forwarded to the bottom layer. Since bottom layer links have total capacity 8, there are at
least two same symbols on the bottom layer links. This contradicts that any two links on the bottom layer should
carry four independent information to achieve rate 4. Therefore forwarding is insufficient for achieving the rate 4
in this network.
Now we show that a generic linear network code, where intermediate nodes do coding, achieves rate 4. From
[22, Ch 19], a generic network code can be constructed with high probability by randomly choosing the global
encoding kernels provided that the base field is sufficiently large. So a random linear network code is generic with
high probability when q is very large. If the adversarial link is on the top or middle layer, then each capacity 2 on
the bottom layer is equivalent to two unit capacity links. Then all links in the network have capacity one and this
problem is reduced to the equal link capacities problem. From [4], rate 6 − 2 × 1 = 4 is achievable. From [22,
Theorem 19.32], since the min-cut between s and (Yi, Yj) is at least 4 for ∀1 6 i 6= j 6 4, in a generic network
code the global encoding kernels on any two links on the bottom layer are linearly independent and they satisfy
the MDS property. Thus an error on the last layer can be corrected.
D. Guess-and-forward
Here we introduce a new achievable coding strategy, guess-and-forward. In this strategy, a node receives some
redundant information from multiple paths. If this information is inconsistent, the node guesses which of its upstream
links controlled by the adversary and forwards its guess to the sink. The sink receives additional information allowing
it to test the hypothesis of the guessing node and correctly identify one or more adversarial links. Altogether a
finite number of guesses are forwarded, so the average overhead of forwarding guesses goes to zero asymptotically
with the total amount of information communicated.
To provide intuition, we first describe a simple version of the guess-and-forward scheme on a particular four-node
network example shown in Fig. 11. From Theorem 1, when z = 2, the capacity is upper bounded by 7. We will
show that rate 7 is achievable in this network using the guess-and-forward scheme.
In this scheme, node A forwards its received information to node B and on multiple links to the sink node t.
This information is received reliably by the sink, but not necessarily by B since the single feedback link from A to
B may be adversarial. Node B also receives reliably from the source node s the information that was sent from s
to A, and compares this with the information forwarded by A. A mismatch indicates that either the feedback link
(A,B) is adversarial or that one or more links from s to A are adversarial. B sends this guess to the sink along
with the information received on link (A,B), which allows the sink to distinguish between the two possibilities.
Note that decoding at the sink relies on knowledge of the network and code, while the guessing node simply has
to compare the feedback with the corresponding information forwarded from the source node.
20
st
A B
✙
✙
✠
❥
❯
❘
◆
❥
❯❯
✲
✙✠✠✠✠
2
2
2
6
11
1
11
∞
∞l1
l2
l3
Fig. 11. Four node acyclic networks: this network consists of 3 links of capacity 2 from s to A, 5 links of capacity 1 from B to t, 1 links
of capacity 6 from A to B. Given the cut ({s, B}, {A, t}), unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source s to its neighbor B
on one side of the cut and from node A to sink t on the other side of the cut, respectively.
To be precise, let W and Wˆ denote the symbols sent by s and received by A respectively on the links from s
to A. W is sent reliably from s to B, and Wˆ is sent reliably from A to t.
In each round, s and B together send a (11, 7) MDS code to A and t across the cut cut({s,B}, {A, t}). Since
the feedback link has capacity 6, A sends its codeword symbols Wˆ to B along feedback link l. For feedback link
l, let Pl denote the information received by B on l. B compares Pl with W which is received from s. If Pl 6=W ,
then B obtains a guess Xl identifying the locations of adversarial links between s and A assuming Pl is reliable.
B sends the claim (Xl, Pl) to t along each link between B and t using repetition code. If Pl = W , B does not
send any claim. B sends claims only when it guesses at least one adversarial forward link which is different from
those guessed in previous rounds. Thus B sends claims in 3 rounds, which is equal to the number of links between
s and A. Note that on a result the number of channel uses is not constant in each round. Since the total number of
channel uses required to send claims is finite, the overhead amortized over a large number of rounds goes to zero
asymptotically with the number of rounds.
Lemma 10: Given the network in Fig. 11, rate 7 is achievable.
Proof: Since there are 5 > 2z+1 links from B to t, any claim (Xl, Pl) can be sent reliably from B to t using
a repetition code.
Case 1) the sink receives some claim (Xl, Pl).
The sink compares Pl with Wˆ which is received from A reliably. If Pl 6= Wˆ , then the feedback link transmitting
Pl is adversarial and the sink ignores it. Otherwise, Pl is reliable. Since the claim is sent, the sink knows that
Pl = Wˆ 6= W and that guess Xl is correct. Thus the sink identifies the forward links in Xl as adversarial, which
are subsequently ignored.
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Case 2) no claims are sent.
In this case, we show that the correct output is achieved. No claims are sent only if either
• B receives W on the feedback link, or
• the guessed set Xl only contains forward links that have been guessed by l in previous rounds. From these
previous rounds, by case 1, the sink has already identified as adversarial either l or the guessed forward links,
and is concerned only with the remaining network.
Either way, there are the following two possibilities for the overall remaining network (recall that A transmits Wˆ
to B):
(I) all links between s and A and the feedback link are uncorrupted.
(II) some links between s and A are corrupted and feedback link is corrupted such that feedback link transmits
error-free output.
In possibility (I), the feedback link transmits W to B. In (II), A sends Wˆ 6=W but the feedback link changes it
to W so that B does not send any claims. We first consider all sets of 7 forward links on the cut. There are
(
8
7
)
= 8
such sets of links. Each set has total capacity at least 9. For each such set L, the sink checks the consistency of
the output of rate 7 obtained from L. We also consider all sets of 6 links such that each set includes all 3 links
between s and A and any 3 links between B and t. There are
(5
3
)
such sets. The sink also checks the consistency
of the output of rate 7 for each set.
Case 2 - a) there is no set of 7 links giving consistent output.
In this case, there are more than 1 forward adversarial link on the cut. Since z = 2, all two adversarial links are
forward links and thus possibility (II) cannot hold. Then possibility (I) is true and there are at most two forward
adversarial links with capacity 1 on the cut. We obtain the correct answer from our (11,7) MDS code.
Case 2 - b) there is no set of 6 links that includes all 3 links from s to A and gives consistent output.
In this case, possibility (II) is true. Then there is at most one forward adversarial link on the cut. We obtain the
correct answer from our (11,7) MDS code.
Case 2 - c) There exist both a 7-link set L1 giving consistent output and a 6-link set L2 that includes all 3 links
between s and A and give consistent output.
It is clear that
∑
l1∈L1∩L2
r(l1) > 7 for any L1 and L2. Thus L1 and L2 give the same consistent output. Since
at least one of (I) and (II) is true, this output is correct.
From cases 1-2, since z = 2, B needs to send claims at most 2 times to obtain the correct output.
V. GUESS-AND-FORWARD ON SOME FAMILIES OF NETWORKS
In this section, we employ the guess-and-forward strategy on a sequence of increasingly complex network families.
The first is a two-node network with multiple feedback links. The second is a four-node acyclic network. The third
is a family of ‘zig-zag’ networks. In the first two cases, the guess-and-forward strategy achieves the capacity. For
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Fig. 12. two-node network G with n forward links and m feedback links.
zig-zag networks, we derive the achievable rate of guess-and-forward strategy and present conditions under which
this bound is tight.
A. Two-node network
We achieve the error-correction capacity of the two-node network with multiple feedback links by using guess-
and-forward strategy. A two-node network shown in Fig. 12 is composed of n forward links with arbitrary capacity
and m feedback links with arbitrary capacity. In Lemma 11, we first characterize the capacity of this network when
each forward link has capacity 1. We extend this result to Theorem 2 when each forward link has arbitrary capacity.
Lemma 11: Consider the two-node network shown in Fig. 12 such that each forward link has capacity 1. Let C
denote the error-correction capacity with z adversarial links. If n 6 2z, C = 0. Otherwise, C = min{n − z, n −
2(z −m)}.
Proof:
From lemma 2 in Section III, upper bound of the capacity is min{n − z, n − 2(z − m)} when n > 2z, and
0 otherwise. So it is sufficient to prove the achievability of this upper bound by applying our guess-and-forward
strategy when n > 2z.
Case 1) m 6 z2 .
Step 1) In each round, the source s sends an (n, n − 2(z − m)) MDS code on the n forward links. Since
m 6 z/2, n− 2(z −m) 6 n− z. Thus for any received n signals, there exist n− 2(z −m) uncorrupted signals.
If all
(
n
n−2(z−m)
)
subsets of received symbols decode to the same message, this message is correct. Otherwise, the
sink sends the n received signals to the source s on each feedback link using a repetition code.
Step 2) Based on the received information on each feedback link, the source tries to identify the bad forward
links. Thus, for each feedback link, the source obtains a claim regarding the location of forward adversarial links
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which is correct if that feedback link is not adversarial.
Step 3) This step consists of m phases, each composed of a finite number of rounds. In the ith phase, the source
sends the claim obtained from the ith feedback link together with what it received on that feedback link to the sink.
This information can be sent reliably to the sink using a repetition code because n − 2z > 0. If what the source
received matches what the sink sent, the ith feedback link was not corrupted and the associated claim is correct.
Using this claim, the sink can decode the message as well as identify at least one of the forward adversarial links.
If all m feedback links were corrupted, the sink knows that there are only z − m forward adversarial links and
since we are using a (n, n− 2(z −m)) MDS code the message is correctly decodable at the sink.
Note that we only need to use the above scheme during the first 2m times the sink sees inconsistency at step 1.
The reason is that from steps 1-3, the sink either figures out that all feedback links are adversarial or identifies at
least one forward adversarial link. If all feedback links are bad, they are ignored and the (n, n− 2(z −m)) MDS
code gives us the correct output. If there are k 6 2m forward adversarial links, after the first k times the sink sees
inconsistency at step 1, all forward adversarial links are identified subsequently and no further inconsistency is seen
among the remaining forward links. Otherwise, when there are more than 2m adversarial links, the sink finds 2m
forward adversarial links and ignores them. Then from [4], the rate n− 2m− 2(z − 2m) = n− 2(z −m) can be
achieved using the remaining forward links only.
Case 2) m > z2 .
In each round, the source s sends an (n, n−z) MDS code on the n forward links. For any received n signals, there
exist n− z uncorrupted signals. If all
(
n
n−z
)
subsets of received symbols decode to the same message, this message
is correct. As in the case 2-a, from steps 2-3, the sink either concludes that all feedback links are adversarial or
identifies at least one forward adversarial link. If all m feedback links were corrupted, there are only z−m < z/2
bad forward links and subsequently only the forward links are used to achieve the rate n− z. Otherwise, the above
scheme is used at most z times inconsistency is seen at step 1, after which the sink has identified all bad forward
links and the remaining forward links suffice to achieve rate n− z.
Now we generalize above result to the general case when each forward link has also arbitrary capacity.
Theorem 2: Consider the two-node network shown in Fig. 12 with arbitrary link capacities. Let Dp denote the
sum of the p smallest forward link capacities. The error-correction capacity is
C =


0 if n 6 2z
min{Dn−z,Dn−2(z−m)+} if n > 2z
Proof: From lemma 2, achievable capacity is 0 when n 6 2z. When n > 2z, we use D to denote the sum
of all n forward link capacities. For achievability, when m 6 z/2, the source sends (D,Dn−z) MDS code to the
sink. When m > z/2, the source sends (D,Dn−2(z−m)+) MDS code to the sink. By using the same strategy as in
the proof of Lemma 11, we can achieve the rate C .
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Fig. 13. Four node acyclic networks: unbounded reliable communication is allowed from source s to its neighbor B and from node A to
sink t, respectively. This network consists of a links of arbitrary capacity from s to A, b links of arbitrary capacity from B to t. From A
to B, there are m feedback links and each feedback link has the minimum capacity.
B. Four-node acyclic network
In this section, we use the guess-and-forward strategy on a four-node acyclic network, the simplest case of a
zigzag network. In this acyclic network, source node s and its neighbor node B lie on one side of a cut that separates
them from sink node t an its neighbor A. As in the cut-set model, we allow unbounded reliable communication
from source s to its neighbor B on one side of the cut and from node A to the sink t on the other side of the cut;
this allows node B to compare information from feedback links with uncorrupted information from the source to
obtain the guess. Similarly, by comparing claims with information reliably transmitted from node A, the sink can
identify the corrupted link.
This network is composed of a set of a forward links {l1, .., la} with arbitrary capacities from s to A, a set of b
forward links {la+1, .., la+b} with arbitrary capacities from B to sink t, and a set of m feedback links from A to B.
Each feedback link has capacity h whose value will be derived in following Section V-B1. C1 =
∑
l∈(l1,..,la)
r(l)
and C2 =
∑
l∈(la+1,..,la+b)
r(l) denotes the sum of forward link capacities from s to A, and from B to t, respectively.
Let C = C1 + C2. Cz is the upper bound on this network obtained from Theorem 1.
In [21], we have shown that rate Cz is asymptotically achievable on this four-node acyclic network when each
feedback link has capacity at least C1. Here we show that rate Cz is achievable even when each feedback link
has smaller capacity than C1. In Section V-B1, we first consider a coding strategy at node A and formulate a
linear optimization problem which gives the minimum capacity of each feedback link that guarantees the success
of our strategy. Then, in Section V-B2, we show that rate Cz is asymptotically achievable this smaller feedback
link capacity using our guess-and-forward strategy.
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Fig. 14. Four node acyclic networks: (a) z = 2 and feedback link transmits (a1+ a2, b1 + b2, c1 + c2). (b) z = 3. Assume that (a1, .., a6),
(b1, .., b6), (c1, .., c4), (d1, .., d4), and (e1, e2, e3) are transmitted on forward links (l1, .., l5) from s to A, respectively. Feedback link
transmits (
∑6
i=1
ai,
∑6
i=1
bi,
∑4
i=1
ci,
∑4
i=1
di,
∑3
i=1
ei).
1) Coding strategy at node A: Suppose that (s,B) sends (C,Cz) MDS code across the cut to (A, t). We consider
the encoding strategy at node A and derive the minimum capacity of each feedback link. Suppose that node A
receives the vector of symbols Wˆ = (Wˆl1 , . . . , Wˆla) from s where Wˆl = (p1l , . . . , p
r(l)
l ) denotes the codewords on
link l ∈ {l1, . . . , la}. We first assume that node A transmits, on each feedback link to B, the same set of codewords
each of which is a linear combination of codewords received on a single link from s to A. Precisely, for any forward
link li, node A transmits on each feedback link g(Wˆli) = (g1li(Wˆli), . . . , g
ki
li
(Wˆli)) where g
j
li
(Wˆli) is a single linear
combination of Wˆli = (p1li , . . . , p
r(li)
li
). Thus, the same value g(Wˆ ) = (g(Wˆl1), .., g(Wˆla )) is transmitted on each
feedback link. For instance, given a network in Fig. 14(a), A transmits g(Wˆ ) = (g(Wˆl1), g(Wˆl2), g(Wˆl3 )) where
g(Wˆl1) = a1 + a2, g(Wˆl2) = b1 + b2, and g(Wˆl3) = c1 + c2.
Here, we define the degree of freedom of forward link l between s and A as follows.
Definition 3: Consider the vector of symbols Wˆl received on forward link l from s to A and assume that node
A transmits k linear combinations of Wˆl, g(Wˆl) = (g1l (Wˆl), . . . , gkl (Wˆl)). Let Ml denote the r(l) × k encoding
matrix at A for link l such that Wˆl ·Ml = g(Wˆl). Then the degree of freedom of link l, f(l), is defined as the
capacity of link l minus the rank of the matrix Ml, i.e., f(l) = r(l)− rank(Ml). For any forward link l between
B and t, we simply define the degree of freedom f(l) as the link capacity, i.e., f(l) = r(l).
For example, in Fig. 14(a), since feedback link transmits (a1 + a2, b1 + b2, c1 + c2), f(l) = 1 for all forward
links from s to A. In Fig. 14(b), since feedback link transmits (∑6i=1 ai,∑6i=1 bi,∑4i=1 ci,∑4i=1 di,∑3i=1 ei),
f(l1) = f(l2) = 5, f(l3) = f(l4) = 3, and f(l5) = 2.
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From the definition of degree of freedom, node A sends
h =
∑
l∈{l1,..,la}
(r(l)− f(l)) = C1 −
∑
l∈{l1,..,la}
f(l) (3)
codewords to B along each feedback link.
Now we introduce our coding strategy at node A as follows.
Node A can choose any g(Wˆ ) which satisfies the following two conditions on the degree of freedom of links.
Condition 1: Given any set A1 composed of 2z forward links,
∑
l∈A1
f(l) 6 C − Cz .
Condition 2: Given any set A2 composed of z forward links and A3 composed of z−m forward links such that
A2 ∩A3 = ∅,
∑
l∈A2
f(l) +
∑
l∈A3
r(l) 6 C − Cz.
Condition 1 means that the sum of the degree of freedom of any 2z forward links are less than or equal to C−Cz.
Condition 2 means that the sum of the degree of freedom of any z links plus the sum of any z−m link capacities is
less than or equal to C−Cz . In the proof of Lemma 13 and 14, we show that these two conditions are necessary to
prove the tightness of our upper bound in Theorem 1. For example network in Fig. 14(a), z = 2 and the upper bound
Cz = 6. 3 codewords sent by A satisfies above two conditions, and feedback capacity 3 is sufficient. Likewise,
when z = 3 and the upper bound Cz = 9 in the network Fig. 14(b), 5 codewords sent by A also satisfies above
two conditions. In [21], the minimum required capacity for each feedback link to achieve rate Cz is the sum of all
forward link capacities between s and A, which is 6 and 23 for the networks in Fig. 14(a) and (b), respectively.
Finally, we formulate a linear optimization problem which gives the minimum capacity of each feedback link,
based on conditions 1 and 2.
min h = C1 −
a∑
i=1
f(li)
f(li) 6 r(li), ∀1 6 i 6 a+ b∑
l∈M
f(l) 6 C − Cz, M ⊂ E , |M | 6 2z
∑
l∈N1
r(l) +
∑
l∈N2
f(l) 6 C − Cz,
N1, N2 ⊂ E , |N1| 6 z −m, |N2| 6 z,N1 ∩N2 = ∅
(4)
Objective function h is defined in equation (3). The first inequality constraint is the link capacity constraint.
The second and third constraints come from condition 1 and 2, respectively. We can check that solving the above
optimization problem for the networks in Fig. 14(a) and (b) gives the feedback link capacities 3 and 5, respectively.
2) Guess-and-forward strategy: In this section, we show the tightness of the upper bound using our guess-and-
forward strategy. Our proof of decoding success requires each feedback link’s capacity to satisfy the lower bound
obtained in (4), so that node B receives sufficient feedback information to guess the corrupted links by comparing
with information reliably received from the source. This feedback link capacity can in general be smaller than that
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in the simple example of Section V-B1, so the details and proof of correctness of the scheme are slightly more
involved.
The guess-and-forward strategy achieving the rate Cz for the four-node acyclic network shown in Fig. 13 is as
follows. In each round, s and B together send a (C,Cz) MDS code5, obtained from Lemma 12 below, to A and
t across the cut cut({s,B}, {A, t}). Let W and Wˆ denote the codewords s sends to A, and A received from s,
respectively. Using the coding strategy in Section V-B1, A sends g(Wˆ ) to B along each feedback link using a
repetition code. For each feedback link l, let Pl denote the information received by B on l. B compares Pl with
g(W ). If Pl 6= g(W ), then B obtains a guess Xl identifying the locations of adversarial links between s and A
assuming Pl is reliable. B does not send any claim if Pl = g(W ), or if the guessed set Xl only contains forward
links that have been guessed by l in previous rounds.
We next show that this strategy achieves rate Cz asymptotically, via the following series of lemmas.
Lemma 12: Given the four-node acyclic network in Fig. 13, let u denote the sum of 2z largest degree of freedom
of links in the network. Suppose the adversary introduces errors on z forward links subject to the constraint that the
values sent along the feedback links are unaffected. There exists a (C,C − u) generic linear code for the forward
links that corrects these z error links.
Proof: See the appendix.
Since the sum of 2z largest degree of freedom is at most C −Cz from the condition 1, we obtain C − u > Cz .
Definition 4: Given a set of any k forward links L = {l1, . . . , lk} in the four-node acyclic network, we say L
gives consistent output if
∑
l∈L r(l) > Cz and the decoded output from any Cz code symbols on L is the same.
Lemma 13: Given the four-node network in Fig. 13 such that b > 2z + 1, rate Cz is achievable.
Proof: Since b > 2z + 1, any claim (Xl, Pl) can be sent reliably from B to t using a repetition code. The
details of proof is presented in the appendix.
Lemma 14: Given the four-node network in Fig. 13 such that b 6 2z, rate Cz is achievable.
Proof: When b 6 2z, reliable transmission of claims from B to t is not guaranteed. Thus we cannot use the
same technique used in the proof of Lemma 13. The proof is presented in the appendix.
C. zig-zag network
In this section, we consider a special case of the zig-zag network, the non-overlapping zig-zag network. We
present conditions under which our upper bound is tight and derive a general achievable bound for non-overlapping
zig-zag network.
We call the network shown in Fig. 15 a k-layer non-overlapping zig-zag network. Unlike the general zig-zag
network, feedback transmission is only possible from Ai to Bi. Ai and Bi can communicate reliably with unbounded
rate to Ai+1 and Bi+1, respectivley. (s = B0, t = Ak+1). Thus, reliable transmission with unbounded rate is possible
from Ai to Aj , and from Bi to Bj for ∀i < j. We use Fi and Wi to denote the set of forward links and feedback
5A generic linear code is MDS.
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Fig. 15. k-layer non-overlapping zig-zag network: Given the cut cut({s,B1, .., Bk}, {A1, .., Ak, t}), Ai and Bi can communicate reliably
with unbounded rate to Ai+1 and Bi+1, respectively.(s = B0, t = Ak+1). The links from Ai to Bi represent feedback across the cut. This
model more accurately captures the behavior of any cut with k feedback links across the cut.
links from Bi−1 to Ai, and from Ai to Bi, respectively. Let |Fi| = bi and |Wi| = mi. In this network, we assume
that each feedback link from Ai to Bi has a sufficient capacity to forward all the information Ai received from
Bi−1. It is clear that the four-node network is 1-layer non-overlapping zig-zag network. Given a k-layer zig-zag
network G, we use Cz to denote the upper bound on G obtained from Theorem 1.
Now we consider the following strategy for non-overlapping zig-zag network which is similar to that for a
four-node network. We use C to denote the sum of all forward link capacities.
In each round, s and (B1, .., Bk) together send a (C,Cz) MDS code to (A1, .., Ak) and t across the cut
cut({s,B1, .., Bk}, {A1, .., Ak, t}). For 1 6 i 6 k, Ai sends its codeword symbols Wˆ to Bi along each feedback
link using a repetition code. For each feedback link l, let Pl denote the information received by Bi on l. Bi
compares Pl with W which is received from s. If Pl 6=W , then Bi obtains a guess Xl identifying the locations of
adversarial links between Bi−1 and Ai assuming Pl is reliable. Bi sends claim (Xl, Pl) to Ai+1 along each link
using repetition code. If Pl = W , Bi does not obtain any claim. For all 2 6 j 6 k, Aj sends any received claim
from Bj−1 to the sink reliably. The above strategy is applied in each round. Bi sends claims only when Xl guesses
at least one adversarial forward link which is different from forward links guessed by l at previous rounds.
For a four-node acyclic network in Fig. 13, Lemma 13 shows that our bound is tight when claims are sent reliably
from node B to the sink t, i.e., b > 2z+1. Using our strategy, we simply extend this result for the non-overlapping
zig-zag network as follows.
Lemma 15: Given a family of k-layer non-overlapping zig-zag networks such that bi > 2z+1 for 2 6 i 6 k+1,
rate Cz is achievable.
Proof: Since bi > 2z + 1 for 2 6 i 6 k + 1, any claim (Xl, Pl) can be sent reliably from Bi−1 to Ai using
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a repetition code. Then Ai sends this claim reliably to sink t. As in the proof of Lemma 13, we first show that
at least one adversarial link is removed whenever sink receives some claim, in case 1. We also show that correct
output is always achievable when no claims are sent in case 2.
Case 1) sink receives some claim (Xl, Pl).
Assume that feedback link l is between Aj and Bj , and Bj sends this claim to Aj+1. In this case, we use the
same strategy as in the case 1 in Lemma 13. Then we show that the sink removes at least one bad link whenever
it receives claim.
Case 2) no claims are sent to the sink.
Similar to the case 2 in the proof of Lemma 13, the case that no claims are sent to the sink occurs only when
for each feedback link l between Aj and Bj either of the following holds:
• the information Bj receives on l is equal to W where W is the uncorrupted codeword sent by s to Bj
• the guessed set Xl only contains forward links that have been guessed by l in previous rounds. From these
previous rounds, by case 1, the sink has already identified as adversarial either l or the guessed forward links,
and is concerned only with the remaining network.
Either way, there are the following two possibilities for the overall remaining network (recall that Aj transmits Wˆ
to Bj).
a) All forward links in (F1,..,Fk) and feedback links in (W1,..,Wk) are not corrupted.
b) For some {i1, .., ip} ⊆ {1, 2, .., k} such that mi1 + .. + mip 6 z, all feedback links in (Wi1 , ..,Wip) are
corrupted and some forward links in (Fi1 , .., Fip ) are corrupted. The furthest downstream forward links in Fk+1
can be also corrupted. For ∀j /∈ {i1, .., ip, k + 1}, links in Fj and Wj are not corrupted.
Let N = {(i1, .., ip)|1 6 i1 < ..,< ip 6 k,mi1+..+mip 6 z}∪{∅}. (Note that {∅} corresponds to the possibility
in a)). From a) and b), there are total |N | possibilities. Exactly only one of them is true. Now we describe how
the correct solution with rate Cz can be obtained. We check the consistency of the output for each possibility. For
each (i1, .., ip) ∈ N , we first remove mi1 + .. + mip corresponding feedback links and check whether there are
K − (z − (mi1 + .. + mip)) forward links giving consistent output such that remaining (z − (mi1 + .. + mip))
forward links are elements of Fi1 ∪ ..∪ Fip ∪ Fk+1. If such a set exists, we denote it by G(i1, .., ip). If there is no
such set of K − (z − (mi1 + ..+mip)) forward links giving consistency, we remove (i1, .., ip) from N and ignore
corresponding possibilities.
Now we show that only tuples (i1, .., ip) such that G(i1, .., ip) gives the correct output remain in N . Since at
least one remaining tuple gives the correct output, it is sufficient to prove that for any remaining (i1, .., ip) ∈ N
and (j1, .., jr) ∈ N , G(i1, .., ip) and G(j1, .., jr) gives the same output. This is equivalent to showing that the sum
of capacities of forward links which are contained in both G(i1, .., ip) and G(j1, .., jr) is at least Cz, i.e.,
∑
l∈G(i1,..,ip)∩G(j1,..,jr)
r(l) > Cz.
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Fig. 16. Reduced non-overlapping zig-zag network G′ such that mu > z and bu+1 > 2z + 1, . . . , bk+1 > 2z + 1. This graph is obtained
from G by erasing all feedback links in W1 ∪W2 . . . ∪Wu−1.
G(i1, .., ip) gives K− (z− (mi1 + ..+mip)) forward links giving consistent output such that remaining (z− (mi1 +
..+mip)) forward links are in Fi1 ∪ ..∪Fip ∪Fk+1. Similarly, G(j1, .., jr) gives K− (z− (mj1 + ..+mjr)) forward
links giving consistent output such that remaining (z− (mj1 + ..+mjr)) forward links are in Fj1 ∪ ..∪Fjr ∪Fk+1.
In this case, from the definition of cut-set upper bound in Lemma 6, the sum of the capacities of forward links
assumed to be correct by both G(i1, .., ip) and G(j1, .., jr) is at least Cz . Since each guess gives consistent output,
these two guesses gives the same output. Since any two remaining guesses in N give the same consistent output,
all remaining guesses give the same output.
We derive another condition under which our bound is tight.
Lemma 16: Given a family of k-layer non-overlapping zig-zag networks such that mu > z and bj > 2z + 1
∀j > u+ 1 for any 1 6 u 6 k, rate Cz is achievable.
Proof: We consider a reduced non-overlapping zig-zag network G′ shown in Fig. 16 which is obtained from
a given k-layer non-overlapping zig-zag network by erasing m1 + .. +mu−1 feedback links W1 ∪ .. ∪Wu−1. We
use C ′z to denote the upper bound on G′ from Theorem 1. Since G′ is weaker than G, it is sufficient to show that
C ′z > Cz and C ′z is achievable on G′.
Step 1) We show that Cz 6 C ′z .
We first compute C ′z on G′ from Theorem 1. Suppose that C ′z is obtained by choosing and A∗ = {Ai1 , .., Aip} ⊆
{Au+1.., Ak} and B∗ = {Aj1 , .., Ajr} ⊆ {Au+1, .., Ak} −A∗ and applying Lemma 6 after erasing k forward links
set F ∗, m feedback links set W ∗. It is sufficient to prove that choosing the same F ∗, W ∗, A∗, and B∗ on original
graph G gives the same upper bound C ′z .
Since mu > z, Au 6∈ A∗ and Au 6∈ B∗ from the definition of upper bound in Lemma 6. Then PA∗ ⊆ FAi1 ∪ ..∪
FAip ⊂ Fu+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Fk, PB∗ ⊆ FAj1 ∪ .. ∪ FAjr ⊂ Fu+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Fk.
31
Since mu > z and bk+1 > z, no matter what W ∗ is erased on G′, chosen downstream links RA∗ and RB∗ are
in Fu+1 ∪ .. ∪ Fk, i.e., RA∗ , RB∗ ∈ Fu+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Fk.
Thus, ZA∗ = PA∗ ∪RA∗ ⊂ Fu+1 ∪ .. ∪ Fk and ZB∗ = PB∗ ∪RB∗ ⊂ Fu+1 ∪ .. ∪ Fk.
Since all erased forward links in ZA∗ ∪ ZB∗ are in Fu+1 ∪ .. ∪ Fk for G′, erasing the same F ∗, W ∗, ZA∗ , and
ZB∗ on original graph G also gives the same upper bound C ′z for G. Since Cz is the minimal upper bound for G,
Cz 6 C
′
z .
Step 2) We show that rate Cz is achievable.
From Lemma 15, since bu+1 > 2z + 1, . . . , bk+1 > 2z + 1 and Cz 6 C ′z , rate Cz is achievable on G′. Thus,
given a non-overlapping zig-zag network G, we first ignore all feedback links between Ai and Bi (1 6 i 6 u− 1)
and apply the same achievable strategy for G′.
From steps 1) and 2), we complete the proof.
Now we derive an achievable rate of guess-and-forward strategy for any non-overlapping zig-zag network.
We use GI to denote the non-overlapping zig-zag network obtained from original G by erasing all feedback links
in Wi such that i 6∈ I . Let b(i, j) =
∑j
u=i+1 bi denote the number of forward links between i th layer and jth
layer. Supersets P , Q, and R are defined as follows.
P = {{i}|1 6 i 6 k},
Q = {{i1, .., iu}|{i1, .., iu} ⊂ {1, .., k}, b(1, i1) > 2z + 1,
b(i1, i2) > 2z + 1, .., b(iu, k + 1) > 2z + 1},
R = {{i1, .., iu}|{i1, .., iu} ⊂ {1, .., k},mi1 > z,
b(i1, i2) > 2z + 1, .., b(iu, k + 1) > 2z + 1}.
Lemma 17: Given the network in Fig. 15, rate maxI∈P∪Q∪RCI is achievable.
Proof: We first show that rate C{i} is achievable for 1 6 i 6 k. We ignore all feedback links except the
feedback links in Wi. Then applying the same achievability strategy for four-node acyclic network gives the rate
C{i} from Lemma 13 and 14.
For any subset I ∈ Q, we ignore all feedback links except the feedback links in Wi such that i ∈ I . Then from
Lemma 15, rate CI is achievable. Similarly, for any subset I ∈ R, rate CI is achievable from Lemma 16. This
completes the proof.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the capacity of single-source single-sink noiseless networks under adversarial attack on no more
than z edges. In this work, we have allowed arbitrary link capacities, unlike prior papers. We have proposed a new
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cut-set upper bound for the error-correction capacity for general acyclic networks. This bound tightens previous cut-
set upper bounds. For example networks where the bounds are tight, we have employed both linear and nonlinear
coding strategies to achieve the capacity. We have proved the insufficiency of linear network codes to achieve the
capacity in general. We also have shown by examples that there exist single-source and single-sink networks for
which intermediate nodes must perform coding, nonlinear error detection or error correction in order to achieve
the network capacity. This is unlike the equal link capacity case, where coding only at the source suffices to
achieve the capacity of any single-source and single-sink network. We have introduced a new achievable strategy,
guess-and-forward, which is used to show the capacity of the two-node network and a family of four-node acyclic
networks. Finally, for a class of so called non-overlapping zig-zag networks, we have derived the rate achieved by
guess-and-forward and presented conditions under which that bound is tight.
Further work includes characterizing the capacity region of a four-node acyclic network when the capacity of
feedback links is small. When the lower bound on the feedback link capacity is not satisfied, we can investigate also
the tightness of our bound or find an achievable capacity region. It would also be interesting to find new achievable
strategies and upper bounds for more general zig-zag and other networks, particularly since cut-set approaches are
not sufficient in general [20]. Investigating networks for which there exists a gap between known upper and lower
bounds may provide further insights. Another related problem, which we treat briefly in our conference paper [17],
considers high-probability correction of errors in a causal adversary model as in [15].
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 12 : Since the adversary controls forward links such that codewords on feedback links are
unchanged, from the definition 3, the degree of freedom of errors that the adversary can control for any forward
link l is at most f(l). We prove this lemma by simply extending [4, Theorem 4] which is for the equal link
capacities case to the unequal link capacities case.
Let M denote the transfer matrix whose columns are the coding vectors assigned to links. Then, the difference
set is
∆(V, z)
= {(θl(e)− θl(e
′)) ·M−1 : l ∈ Γ+(t), N(e) 6 z,N(e
′) 6 z}
= {θl(e− e
′) ·M−1 : l ∈ Γ+(t), N(e) 6 z,N(e
′) 6 z}
= {θl(d) ·M
−1 : l ∈ Γ+(t), N(d) 6 2z},
where N(e) denotes the number of links error e occurs and θl(e) denotes the output of error vector e at the sink
with zero-input.
Last equality comes from {e− e′ : N(e) 6 z,N(e′) 6 z} = {d : N(d) 6 2z}.
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We use p to denote the maximum number of different error vectors when the adversary controls 2z links. Since
∆(V, z) = {θl(d) ·M
−1 : l ∈ Γ+(t), N(d) 6 2z},
|∆(V, z)| 6 p ·
2z∑
i=0
(
a+ b
i
)
.
Since u is the sum of 2z largest degree of freedom, p 6 (q − 1)u. Thus,
|∆(V, z)| 6 (q − 1)u
2z∑
i=0
(
a+ b
i
)
6 2C(q − 1)u,
where C is the sum of all forward link capacities.
After computing the size of the difference set ∆(V, z), we apply exactly the same argument as in [4, Theorem
4]. From the argument in the proof of [4, Theorem 4], it is sufficient to show the existence of u×C parity check
matrix H such that for all w ∈ ∆∗(V, z), Hwτ 6= 0 where ∆∗(V, z) = ∆(V, z)−{0}. By using the same technique
in [4, Theorem 4], the number of matrices H such that there exists w ∈ ∆∗(V, z) satisfying Hwτ = 0 is upper
bounded by
qu(n−1)(q − 1)−1(∆(V, z) − 1)
< 2Cqu(n−1)(q − 1)−1(q − 1)u
=
2Cqun
q
.
Thus, if q is a prime power such that q > 2C , then there must exist a u× C matrix such that Hwτ 6= 0 for all
w ∈ ∆∗(V, z) and the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 13 :
Since b > 2z+1, any claim (Xl, Pl) can be sent reliably from B to t using a repetition code. In case 1, we first
show that at least one adversarial link is removed whenever sink receives some claim. In case 2, we show that rate
Cz is achievable even when no claims are sent from B.
Case 1) sink receives some claim (Xi, Pi).
The sink compares Pi with g(Wˆ ) which is received from A reliably. If Pi 6= g(Wˆ ), then feedback link transmitting
Pi is adversarial and the sink ignores it. Otherwise, Pi is reliable. Since the claim is sent, the sink knows that
Pi = g(Wˆ ) 6= g(W ) and that guess Xi is correct. Thus the sink identifies as adversarial the links in Xi, which are
subsequently ignored. Therefore, in this case, the sink removes at least one bad link whenever B sends claims.
Case 2) no claims are sent.
From our strategy, the case that no claims are sent from B occurs only when for each feedback link l either of
the following holds:
• the information B receives on l is equal to g(W ) where W is the uncorrupted codeword sent by s to B
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• the guessed set Xl only contains forward links that have been guessed by l in previous rounds. From these
previous rounds, by case 1, the sink has already identified as adversarial either l or the guessed forward links,
and is concerned only with the remaining network.
Either way, there are the following three possibilities for the overall remaining network (recall that A transmits Wˆ
to B).
(I) All links between s and A and all feedback links are uncorrupted. Then Wˆ = W and g(W ) is reliably
transmitted.
(II) Some links between s and A are corrupted so that A receives g(Wˆ ) 6= g(W ) from s, but the adversary
controls all feedback links such that each feedback link changes g(Wˆ ) to g(W ).
(III) Some links between s and A are corrupted such that codewords A sends along each feedback link are
unchanged, i.e., Wˆ 6=W and g(Wˆ ) = g(W ). All feedback links are reliable and B receives g(W ).
If possibility (I) is true, all links between s and A and all feedback links are uncorrupted. Then there exists a set
of (a+ b− z) forward links on the cut such that this set includes all a links between s and A and some b− z links
between B and t, and gives consistent output with rate Cz. (Note that the sum of capacities of any (a + b − z)
forward links is larger than or equal to Cz from the definition of our bound in Theorem 1.) If possibility (II) is
true, all m feedback links are corrupted. Then there exist a set of (a + b − z +m) forward links on the cut that
gives consistent output with rate Cz . If possibility (III) is true, then we obtain the correct output from (C,Cz) MDS
code in Lemma 12.
Based on the above analysis, we give the following simple decoding algorithm and prove the correctness of this
algorithm as follows.
Algorithm 2 Decoding algorithm for achieving rate Cz when no claims are sent.
IF there is a set L1 which is composed of a+ b− z +m forward links and gives consistent output,
THEN the output with rate Cz from L1 is correct.
ELSE IF there is a set L2 which is composed of all a forward links from s to A and some b− z forward links
from B to t, and gives consistent output,
THEN the output with rate Cz from L2 is correct.
ELSE the output with rate Cz obtained from (C,Cz) MDS code is correct.
END IF
Case 2 - a) there is a set L1 composed of (a+ b− z +m) forward links giving consistent output.
In this case, we show that output with rate Cz obtained from L1 is correct. First we prove that output from L1
is correct when (II) or (III) is true. If (II) is true, all m feedback links are corrupted and thus L1 contains at least
(a + b − z + m) − (z − m) = a + b − 2(z − m) uncorrupted links. From the definition of our upper bound in
Lemma 5, the sum of capacities of any a+ b−2(z−m) forward links is larger than or equal to Cz . Since L1 gives
consistent output, the output is correct. If (III) is true, L1 contains at most z corrupted links. In this case, we can
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show that L1 gives correct output using condition 2. Since (III) is true and the values on feedback links remain the
same, when adversary controls a set of z forward links, A1, the degree of freedom adversary can control is at most∑
l∈A1
f(l) (|A1| = z). From condition 2, the sum of degree of freedom of z links in A1 plus the sum of capacities
of z −m forward links not included in L1 is less than or equal to Cz , i.e.,
∑
l∈A1
f(l) +
∑
l∈E−L1
r(l) 6 C −Cz .
Therefore, L1 contains at least rate C − (C − Cz) = Cz uncorrupted output and the output is correct. As shown
above, using condition 2, we have shown that L1 contains at least one correct output if (III) is true and complete
the proof from the consistency of L1.
Case 2 - a - i) there is no set of (a + b − z) links that includes all a forward links from s to A and gives
consistent output.
In this case, possibility (I) cannot hold and thus (II) or (III) is true. Thus output from L1 is correct.
Case 2 - a - ii) there exists a set L2 composed of (a + b − z) forward links that includes all a links from s to
A and gives consistent output.
We first show that L1 and L2 gives the same consistent output. L1 ∩ L2 is obtained from the cut by erasing
z forward links from B to t that L2 does not include and z − m forward links L1 does not include. From the
definition of our bound in Lemma 6,
∑
l∈L1∩L2
r(l) > Cz . Thus L1 and L2 give the same consistent output. Since
L2 gives the correct output when (I) is true, and L1 and L2 give the same consistent output in this case, output
from L1 is correct when (I) is true. Moreover, we have already shown that L1 gives the correct output if (II) or
(III) is true. Therefore, L1 always gives correct output.
Case 2 - b) there is no set of (a+ b− z +m) forward links giving consistent output.
In this case, there are more than z −m adversarial forward links on the cut. Thus (II) cannot hold and (I) or
(III) is true. If there is no set of (a+ b− z) forward links that includes all a links from s to A and gives consistent
output, then (III) is true. From Lemma 12, output obtained from (C,Cz) MDS code is correct. Otherwise, suppose
that there exists a set L2 composed of (a + b − z) forward links that includes all a links from s to A and gives
consistent output. We show that output obtained from L2 is correct.
If possibility (I) is true, since all links between s and A and all feedback links are uncorrupted, L2 contains at
most z corrupted forward links between B and t. From the definition of the Singleton bound, the sum of capacities
of a links between s and A plus the sum of any b − 2z forward links between B and t is larger than or equal
to Cz. Thus, from uncorrupted a links between s and A and some b − 2z links between B and t which are not
corrupted, we obtain the correct output rate Cz. Since L2 gives consistent output, the decoded output is correct.
If possibility (III) is true, the adversary controls some forward links from s to A such that each feedback link
transmits g(W ), and L2 contains at most z unknown corrupted links. Using condition 1, we will show that the
output obtained from L2 is correct. If A2 is a set of truly corrupted forward links, the degree of freedom adversary
can control is at most
∑
l∈A2
f(l) (|A2| 6 z). From the definition, the degree of freedom of any forward link
from B to t is equal to the link capacity. From the condition 1, the sum of degree of freedom of truly corrupted
links in A2 and the sum of z forward links between B and t which are not included in L2 is less than or equal
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to C − Cz . Therefore, L2 contains at least C − (C − Cz) = Cz uncorrupted symbols. Since L2 gives consistent
output, the decoded output from L2 is correct. As shown above, when (III) is true, we can obtain correct output
using condition 1.
Therefore, either (I) or (III) is true, L2 gives the correct output.
Proof of Lemma 14 :
Since b 6 2z, a claim (Xl, Pl) for any feedback link l is not reliably transmitted to the sink and adversarial
links between B and t can corrupt this claim arbitrarily. Thus, the sink can receive different claims on different
incoming links. Let G(l) be the set of distinct claims G(l) = {(Xl1, Pl1), .., (Xlk , Plk), Y } where Y denotes that
no claims received. Here is the outline of the proof. We first show that at least one adversarial link is removed
except when b > z and the sink receives no claim on all b links for all feedback links. When b > z and the sink
receives no claim on all b links, since all b links cannot be corrupted at the same time, the sink knows that B does
not send any claim. This case exactly corresponds to the case 2 in the proof of Lemma 13 and we achieve the
correct output. This completes the proof. Note that the same guess-and-forward strategy in Section V-B2 is used.
First we show that any uncorrupted (a+ b− 2z) forward links between s and A give the correct decoded output
with rate Cz . From the definition of Singleton bound, after erasing b 6 2z links between B and t and any set of
2z − b links between s and A, the sum of the remaining link capacities are larger than or equal to Cz . Thus any
uncorrupted (a+ b− 2z) links between s and A give the correct message.
Now we assume that (Xli, Pli) is received on ni links and Y is received on nk+1 links (n1+ ..+nk+1 = b). First
we ignore any (Xli, Pli) claiming that there are more than z−(b−ni) adversarial links between s and A. Since Xli
is shown on ni links, believing Xli implies more than z adversarial links on the cut which is a contradiction. Thus,
each of remaining claim (Xlj , Plj) specifies a set Lj which is composed of at least (a−(z−(b−ni))) = a+b−z−ni
links between s and A claimed to be correct by (Xlj , Plj). For each such claim, we check the consistency of the
decoded outputs of Lj . We show that if there exist two different claims (Xli, Pli) and (Xlj , Plj) both corresponding
to consistent outputs, then those two outputs should be the same. Since |Li| = a+ b−z−ni, |Lj| = a+ b−z−nj ,
and |Li ∪ Lj | 6 a,
|Li ∩ Lj | > (a+ b− z − ni) + (a+ b− z − nj)− a
> a+ b− 2z.
As we mentioned at the beginning of the proof, the sum of capacities of any (a+ b − 2z) link between s and A
is larger than or equal to Cz . Therefore Li and Lj give the same consistent output.
Suppose that we have figured out that a set of links L gives the correct consistent decoded output. In this case,
we add remaining links not included in L sequentially to L, and check the consistency of any decoded output with
rate Cz . If outputs are no more consistent, the added link is adversarial (*).
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Now we show that at least one adversarial link is removed except when b > z and the sink receives no claim
on all b links for all feedback links.
Case 1) all claims are ignored or none of the remaining claims gives consistent output or all claims (Xli, Pli)
that give consistent output satisfy that Pli 6= Wˆ
In this case, there are only two possibilities.
(I) feedback link l is adversarial.
(II) feedback link l is reliable and all b links between B and t are adversarial.
If b > z, then possibility (II) cannot hold and feedback link l is adversarial. We remove it. If b 6 z, the sink
checks the consistency of outputs from each set of (a + b − z) links between s and A. If no (a + b − z) links
set give consistency, then there are more than z − b adversarial links between s and A. Thus possibility (I) is true
and we remove feedback link l. Otherwise, there exists a set L of (a+ b− z) links giving consistency. Since this
set contains at most z corrupted links, and thus includes at least (a+ b− 2z) uncorrupted links between s and A.
Then the sum of capacities of uncorrupted links are larger than or equal to Cz . Thus L gives correct output rate
Cz . From (*), we can detect forward adversarial links in this case.
Case 2) there exists a claim (Xli, Pli) giving consistent output and Pli = Wˆ .
We show that the output obtained from claim (Xli, Pli) should be correct. If there is at least one uncorrupted link
showing (Xli, Pli), then feedback link l is also not corrupted since Pli = Wˆ , and this claim gives correct output
rate Cz . Otherwise, if all ni links showing this claim are adversarial, then there are at most z−ni adversarial links
between s and A. Then Li includes at least (a+ b− z − ni)− (z − ni) = a+ b− 2z uncorrupted links, and thus
gives correct consistent output. From (*), we can also detect adversarial links in this case.
Case 3) only Y gives consistent output and b < z.
In this case, the set of all a forward links from s to A gives consistent output. The a links between s and A
include at least a− z > a+ b− 2z uncorrupted links since b < z. Thus we obtain correct consistent output from
a links and detect adversarial links from (*).
Case 4) only Y gives consistent output, b > z, and at least one of b links between B and t show claim different
from Y , i.e., nk+1 < b.
Case 4 - a) nk+1 < b− z.
If feedback link l is reliable, the links showing claims different from Y are adversarial. Thus there are more than
b− nk+1 > z adversarial links and this is a contradiction. Thus feedback link l is adversarial and we remove it.
Case 4 - b) b− z 6 nk+1 6 z.
Y is shown on nk+1 > b − z links and b − nk+1 > b − z links show claims different from Y . Thus there are
at least b− z adversarial links between B and t. Then there are at most 2z − b adversarial links between s and A
and at least a + b − 2z uncorrupted links. Thus we also obtain correct output from a links and use (*) to detect
the adversarial links.
Case 4 - c) z < nk+1 < b.
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Since nk+1 > z, feedback link l transmits g(Wˆ ) = g(W ) to B and B does not send any claim. Thus, the links
showing claims different from Y are all adversarial.
For cases 1-4, we have shown that at least one adversarial link is removed when b > z and the sink receives
some claim different from Y for any feedback link.
To complete the proof it is now sufficient to show that correct output can be achieved when b > z and the sink
receives no claim for all feedback links l. Since b > z, at least one link between B and t is uncorrupted. Since all
b links show Y , this means that each feedback link transmits g(Wˆ ) = g(W ) and B does not send any claim. This
case corresponds to the case 2 in Lemma 13. Therefore, we can obtain the correct output.
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